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1.  The Ethics of Giving and Effective Altruism  
 
The ethics of giving has traditionally focused on whether, and how much, to give to charities 
helping people in extreme poverty.
2
  In more recent years, the discussion has increasingly 
focused on where to give, spurred by an appreciation of the substantial differences in cost-
effectiveness between charities.  According to a commonly cited example, $40,000 can be used 
either to help 1 blind person by training a seeing-eye dog in the United States or to help 2,000 
blind people by providing surgeries reversing the effects of trachoma in Africa.
3
  Effective 
altruists recommend that we give large sums to charity, but by far their more central message is 
that we give effectively, i.e., to whatever charities would do the most good per dollar donated.
4
  
In this paper, I’ll assume that it’s not wrong not to give bigger, but will explore to what extent it 
may well nonetheless be wrong not to give better.   
The main claim I’ll argue for here is that in many cases it would be wrong of you to give 
a sum of money to charities that do less good than others you could have given to instead, even if 
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it would not have been wrong of you not to give the money to any charity at all.  I’ll assume that 
all the charities under discussion here do positive good overall, do not cause harm, do not 
infringe rights, etc.
5
   
What makes my main claim here particularly interesting is that it is inconsistent with 
what appears to be a fairly common assumption in the ethics of giving, according to which if it is 
not wrong of you to keep some sum money for yourself, then it is likewise not wrong of you to 
donate it to any particular charity you choose.
6
  Roughly:  if it’s up to you whether to donate the 
money, it’s also up to you where to donate the money.  I will challenge this common assumption. 
 
 
2.  Moral Options 
 
I’ll here conceive of “good” and “bad” from an impartial, or agent-neutral, perspective.  Suppose 
that in one outcome, you consume an ice cream cone, and, for some unrelated reason and 
unbeknownst to you, five distant people suffer intense pain and die.  In a second outcome, none 
of these things occur.  While the first outcome may be better for you than the second, the first 
outcome seems worse than the second from an impartial perspective.
7
  Or, as I’ll more simply 
say, the first outcome seems worse.  I’ll occasionally refer to acts as better or worse; this is 
merely an economical way of referring to acts that promote better or worse outcomes.  (Also, 
throughout the paper “good” can be replaced with “expected good,” and “outcomes” can be 
replaced with “prospects,” etc., without any loss to the main argument.) 
According to consequentialism, an act is wrong if and only if and because it promotes a 
worse outcome than another available act would have done.  My argument against the common 
assumption will be non-consequentialist in nature.  That is, while I will suppose that promoting 
the good is a morally relevant factor, I will suppose that it is not the only morally relevant factor.  
In particular, I will suppose that there are moral options, according to which it is at least 
sometimes not wrong for you to act in a way that would result in less good than if you had 
performed some other act instead.
8
  It may well be best, for example, for you to give away nearly 
all of your income to a cost-effective charity while working tirelessly to earn still more to give.  
If so, then both consequentialism and “consequentialism-plus-constraints”9 would imply that it 
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would be wrong of you not to do so.  But, with intuition and commonsense morality, I will 
suppose that it is not wrong of you not to make such substantial sacrifices of your own well-
being, i.e., you possess the moral option not to do so. 
Merely to keep my discussion relatively tidy, I’ll be assuming that the primary agent-
neutral reasons for donating to charity are rooted in promoting the good, or benevolence, rather 
than in justice, e.g., respecting human rights or discharging duties of compensation or 
rectification.
10
   
 
 
3.  Optionality about Whether to Help 
   
So there are moral options.  But what is the basis of the moral option not to help others, e.g., by 
giving to charity, when doing so would be best?  A very natural and plausible answer is that the 
basis of such a moral option is the cost to you, the agent.  If in order to rescue a drowning child 
you had to sacrifice both your legs, then intuitively you would have the moral option not to help.  
But if the only cost to you of saving the drowning child were muddied shoes, you would lack the 
moral option not to help.  In both scenarios, we can assume that it would be best to help.  What 
makes it not wrong not to do what’s best in the first scenario is the substantial cost to you; since 
the cost to you in the second scenario is very small, no such moral option is triggered, and so 
here it is wrong not to do what’s best.   
The basis of the moral option not to do what’s best is plausibly somewhat more complex 
– a function both of the amount of good you would do if you did what’s best, as well as the cost 
to you of doing so.  Nonetheless, for convenience I will in the first instance focus just on the cost 
to you.    
Moreover, and importantly, I’ll here construe “cost” very broadly to include any loss to 
you in terms of your well-being, desires, projects, personal concerns, special relationships, etc.
11
  
Arguably these various sorts of cost are distinct and can come apart, e.g., arguably you can 
sacrifice your well-being in order to promote your projects.  For present purposes I will remain 
agnostic about whether this is correct.  The reason I construe “cost” so broadly is to be inclusive 
about what the basis of the moral option not to do what’s best might be.  At least, everything I 
argue here is consistent with taking losses to you in terms of your well-being, projects, or 
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personal concerns, etc. as the basis of such a moral option.  It is also consistent with the view that 
it’s the cost to you over the course of your whole life, rather than merely the cost to you now, 
that serves as the basis of the moral option.  The cost to you on some particular occasion might 
be small, but it may not be wrong of you to refuse to incur it if in the past you’ve incurred 
substantial costs for the sake of promoting the good.  But again this paper is not about how much 
one must give to charity to avoid acting wrongly.  I will not be defending any answer to the 
question of how big the cost to you needs to be for it to be the case that it would not be wrong for 
you not to give, even when giving would be best.
12
   
There are many cases in which you can either do nothing or instead perform one of a 
number of helpful acts, where each of the helpful acts would do more good than doing nothing, 
but the cost to you of doing any of the helpful acts is high enough that it would not be wrong of 
you to do nothing (as with charities, I’ll assume that none of the helpful acts in question cause 
harm, infringe rights, etc.).  In such cases, I’ll say that there’s optionality about whether to help.  
In this section I’ve claimed that the basis of such optionality is the cost to you.   
 
 
4.  Optionality about Where to Help 
 
What about optionality about where to help, i.e., having the moral option to perform some 
helpful acts over others, even when they would do less good?  The same basis of the moral 
option not to help at all sometimes also serves as the basis of the moral option to perform some 
helpful acts over others.  Suppose there are two charities:  giving your $1,000 to one would do 
slightly less good than giving it to the other, but the first charity represents a cause much closer 
to your heart, e.g., fighting blindness.  Arguably, it’d not be wrong of you to give your $1,000 to 
the first charity, even though this is not best.  This is because the cost to you of giving to the 
other charity instead of this one is substantial.  Thus, we should not unqualifiedly claim that 
while it is permissible not to give a large portion of your income to charity, it would be wrong 
not to allocate whatever portion you do give in whatever way would do the most good.  The 
basis of the moral option not to give will sometimes also serve as the basis of the moral option 
where to give.
13
 
 Nonetheless, my main claim here is that in many cases it would be wrong of you to give a 
sum of money to charities that do less good than other charities you could give to instead, even if 
it would not have been wrong of you not to give the money to any charity at all.  This claim is 
inconsistent with the common assumption noted above that if it is not wrong of you to keep some 
sum of money for yourself, then it is likewise not wrong of you to donate it to any particular 
charity you choose.  Unless there is something morally special about money, this particular 
common assumption goes hand-in-hand with the more general  
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 Common Assumption:  Optionality about whether to help at all entails optionality about  
which particular helpful act to perform.  
 
Therefore, arguing against Common Assumption constitutes an important initial phase of 
my defense of my main claim.  
 
 
5.  Optionality Whether to Help Without Optionality Where to Help 
 
In arguing against Common Assumption, I’ll appeal to a case involving some speedy runaway 
trains. 
 
 Arm Donor:  There is one innocent stranger stuck on track A, and a runaway train  
headed straight toward her.  There are one hundred innocent strangers stuck on 
track B, and another runaway train headed straight toward them.  If you do 
nothing, all one hundred and one people will soon die.  However, you can use 
your arm as a train-stopper; those tied to the tracks are far enough away that 
putting your arm on either track would cause the relevant train to slow down and 
come to a complete stop before reaching anyone in its path.  That is, if you place 
your arm on track A, you’ll stop the train on that track in time and save the one, 
and, if you place your arm on track B, you’ll stop the train on that track in time 
and save the hundred.  You have no other means of saving any of these people.  
Since the two tracks are 20 feet apart, you won’t be able to sacrifice more than 
one arm in time to save all one hundred and one.  Assume that losing your arm is 
a large enough cost to you to make it not wrong not to incur this cost, whether 
that’s in order to save one life or one hundred.  All other things are equal. 
 
While not wrong to do nothing, and not wrong to place your arm on track B, saving the 
hundred, it seems it would be wrong for you to place your arm on track A, saving the one.
14
  In 
general, it seems wrong to fail to save more lives when this is no costlier to you, other things 
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equal.  If these intuitions are correct, then, contrary to Common Assumption, we have optionality 
about whether to help without optionality about where to help. 
If you think it makes for a clearer or otherwise better example, you can restate the case so 
that the cost to you of stopping either train is substantial pain or some other kind of serious well-
being setback, rather than the loss of a limb.  Moreover, if you are skeptical that it is wrong not 
to save the greater number (even when other things are equal),
15
 you can substitute different 
specific details such that stopping the train on track A promotes 1 unit of good whereas stopping 
the train on track B promotes 100 units of good.  The point I’m arguing for here is not wedded to 
any terribly specific account of what the good consists in, or to the claim that the number of lives 
saved matters, etc.  But for the sake of concreteness it often helps to work in terms of different 
numbers of lives saved.  General-level intuition here appears to support the following principle: 
 
 Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak):  It is wrong to perform an act that is much worse  
than another, if it is no costlier to you to perform the better act, and if all other 
things are equal.   
 
Two remarks about this principle:  First, it is somewhat stronger than the intuitive claims 
made about Arm Donor.  Though controversial, let us suppose for the sake of illustration that it 
would be much better to bring into existence many people who would have lives well worth 
living than to refrain from doing so.  Even if so, we might think it would not be wrong of you to 
refrain from doing this, even if it were no costlier to you to do so than not.
16
  While we might 
thereby deny Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak), it seems the principle could be weakened to 
accommodate such thoughts.  For instance, we could instead restrict the principle to acts that are 
much worse than others in virtue of failing to significantly benefit existing people who are not 
very well off, or in virtue of failing to spare such people from significant harm.  Since adopting 
this restricted version of Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) would create no special obstacles 
for my argument for my main claim here, I will, for ease of presentation, refer to the original, 
unrestricted version.  Readers should feel free to interpret “worseness” here along the lines of 
failure to significantly benefit existing people etc. 
Second, Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) is compatible with the view that, in many 
cases, there is no best act.  Instead there may be only an “upper set” of acts, such that any act in 
this upper set is better than any act outside it, and such that those acts within the upper set are 
roughly equally good, on a par, or incommensurable
17
 – or perhaps it is indeterminate how acts 
in the upper set rank in comparison to one another, or maybe we are just utterly clueless as to 
how they do.  Arguably such cases are especially likely to arise in the context of giving to 
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charity, as many charitable causes are difficult to compare.  Thus there may be no best charity, 
but only an upper set of charities.
18
   
Recall that in Arm Donor, you have three acts available to you at a single time: 
 
(i) Do nothing     
(ii) Do a helpful act   
(iii) Do a much more helpful act    
 
where (i) involves no cost to you; (ii) would promote more good than (i); (iii) would 
promote much more good than (ii); the cost to you of doing either (ii) or (iii) is substantial; the 
cost to you of doing either (ii) or (iii) is the same.  
In the context of Arm Donor, I claimed that (i) and (iii) are not wrong, but that (ii) is 
wrong.  This seems a plausible particular-level claim.  But it is also supported by the plausible 
general principle, Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak).  This principle implies that (ii) is wrong.  
The existence of moral options implies that (i) is not wrong.  And (iii) is clearly not wrong.  So 
we have particular-level and general-level intuitive support for this moral ranking of (i), (ii), and 
(iii).  Since Common Assumption implies that (ii) is wrong only if (i) is too, we have intuitive 
support in favor of its denial.
19
 
One might skeptically respond:  “How can it be not wrong to stand by and do nothing but 
wrong to rather kindly incur a cost and do something better than doing nothing?”  This question 
is intended to provoke the intuition that the moral ranking of (i), (ii), and (iii) I’ve offered is an 
implausible one, in virtue of assigning (i) a higher moral status than (ii).
20
  The intuition here is 
that (ii) is wrong only if (i) is wrong too.  One might then continue:  the implausibility of this 
moral ranking not only shows that Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) has implausible 
implications, but that, on reflection, it is not an intuitively plausible principle after all.   
 I do not agree.  True, if (i) and (ii) were the only available acts, it would be permissible to 
perform (ii).  But it is a familiar feature in non-consequentialist ethics that the moral status of an 
act can depend on which alternative acts are available.  In this case, the presence of (iii) alters the 
moral status of (ii), thereby altering the way that (ii) and (i) compare morally.  I believe the 
intuition that (ii) is wrong only if (i) is wrong too has force only when considering these acts in 
isolation from the full choice situation.  But with the full choice situation in view, it is clear that 
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there is something to be said against (ii) that cannot be said against (i) or (iii):  the performance 
of (ii) constitutes a deliberate refusal to do something much better at no extra cost.  This is a 
serious moral failing.   
 So there are some cases in which there is optionality about whether to help without 
optionality about where to help.  Unless there’s something particularly morally relevant about 
helping by giving away limbs to stop trains as opposed to helping by giving away money to fund 
charities, we should also accept that there are some cases in which there is optionality about 
whether to give without optionality about where to give. 
 Here one might respond that there is something morally special about money; in 
particular, one might argue that moral property rights can generate optionality about whether and 
where to give.  But it seems dubious that moral property rights generate either sort of optionality 
when you can do a lot of good at no cost to yourself, or a lot more good at no extra cost to 
yourself.  Suppose you have the moral property right to the $1,000 in your legal possession, but 
that (perhaps because you enjoy helping others) it’d not be costly to you all-things-considered to 
give away this $1,000 to save a life.  Intuitively it would be wrong not to give away the money to 
save a life.  Next we can suppose instead that it would be very costly to you to give away the 
$1,000, such that it wouldn’t be wrong not to give it away to save lives.  Now, faced with the 
choice of using your $1,000 to save one stranger or to save one hundred, and supposing it’s 
equally costly to you to do either act, it seems implausible that it would be permissible to save 
the one merely on the basis of moral property rights.  Appeals to moral property rights cannot 
plausibly support the general claim that if it’s up to you whether to donate a sum of money, then 
it’s also up to you where to donate the money.21   
 Finally, one might argue that you simply enjoy some degree of bare moral freedom that, 
independently of cost (in my broad sense) and independently of moral property rights, gives you 
the moral option to do less good than you could have done.  There are good reasons to be 
skeptical of such bare moral freedom as an independent source of moral options.
22
  Even 
bracketing this skepticism, bare moral freedom seems insufficient to generate optionality about 
whether to give when you can do a lot of good at no cost to yourself, and insufficient to generate 
optionality about where to give when you can do a lot more good at no extra cost to yourself.  
This is for reasons parallel to those cited above in connection with moral property rights, e.g., 
even if it is permissible for you not to give away your $1,000 to save lives, if faced with the 
choice of using your $1,000 to save one stranger or to save one hundred, and if it were equally 
costly to you to do either act, it seems implausible that it would be permissible to save the one 
merely on the basis of bare moral freedom. 
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address to the Oxford Union:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTUrwO9-B_I. 
22 See Shelly Kagan (The Limits of Morality) and Richard Arneson, “Moral Limits on the Demands of 
Beneficence?” in The Ethics of Assistance: Morality, Affluence, and the Distant Needy, ed. by Deen K. Chatterjee 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.33-58. 
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6.  Can We Cheaply Avoid Gratuitous Worseness? 
 
Consider once again the choice between: 
 
(i) Do nothing (keep $1,000 for yourself)    
(ii) Do a helpful act (give $1,000 to charity A)   
(iii) Do a much more helpful act (give $1,000 to charity B)   
 
Again:  (i) involves no cost to you; (ii) would promote more good than (i); (iii) would 
promote much more good than (ii); the cost to you of doing either (ii) or (iii) is substantial; the 
cost to you of doing either (ii) or (iii) is the same.  
Suppose that, on the basis of the substantial cost to you, it is not wrong not to give the 
$1,000 to charity.  Given the particulars of the case, I’ve argued that (i) and (iii) are not wrong, 
whereas (ii) is wrong.   
One might object:  “Acceptance of your view will motivate readers to switch from less 
cost-effective giving (ii) to not giving at all (i).  They will prefer to avoid wrongdoing the cheap 
way.”23   
  The first thing to note in response is that even if accepting my view would have 
undesirable effects, this is no objection to its truth.  The second is that it is doubtful readers will 
in fact react to reading my paper by not giving at all, though this is an empirical claim I cannot 
defend here.  A further point an effective altruist would urge us to consider:  even if many 
readers did switch from (ii) to (i), as long as just a small proportion switched from (ii) to (iii) this 
would remain a net change for the better, given that the (iii) type charities in the “upper set” 
arguably do so much more good per dollar donated than those (ii) type charities outside it. 
 One might next object:  “Your view permits a switch from less cost-effective giving (ii) 
to not giving at all (i), as after all on your view (i) is permissible.  That is implausible.”   
There are two responses available here.  Obviously I could resist, arguing that it is 
permissible to switch from (ii) to (i).  On the other hand, I could revise my view so that it avoids 
implying that it is permissible to switch from (ii) to (i).  The objection cannot be to the 
permissibility of (i) when not switching from (ii) – this would be too broad, and at odds with the 
assumption that there is a moral option that permits the agent to do (i).  Thus those pressing the 
objection must recognize some condition on the permissibility of (i) such that while (i) is wrong 
in all or at least some cases of switching from (ii), it is not wrong when not switching from (ii).  I 
had been assuming up to this point in the paper that agents who would choose (i) were not 
switching from (ii).  In these familiar non-switching cases the condition on the permissibility of 
(i) is satisfied, yielding the familiar moral ranking:  (i) and (iii) are permissible, whereas (ii) is 
wrong.  But in all or at least some switching cases the condition on the permissibility of (i) isn’t 
satisfied, and so only (iii) is permissible.   
I will not attempt here to determine whether the “resist” response or the “revise” response 
is more plausible.  Those who find the former implausible should find the latter plausible, and 
those who find the latter implausible should find the former plausible.  This is sufficient for my 
                                                          
23
 In a similar vein, Bernard Williams wrote of Singer’s view (as first presented in “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality”) that, “As moral persuasion, this kind of tactic is likely to be counterproductive and to lead to a defensive 
and resentful contraction of concern” (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p.212, n.7). 
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present purposes.  But, for the sake of concreteness, let’s very briefly consider a particular way 
in which one might develop the “revise” response:   
It is permissible to switch from (ii) to (i) only if the agent chooses (i) for an appropriate 
kind of reason, e.g., in order to avoid the cost of giving.
24
  Choosing (i) merely in order to avoid 
wrongfully doing (ii), when one could have at no extra cost avoided this wrongdoing by doing 
(iii) instead, is intuitively an inappropriate kind of reason.  So, we get different moral rankings of 
(i), (ii), and (iii) depending on the agent’s reason for choosing (i).  It needn’t be that all cases of 
switching from (ii) to (i) involve choosing (i) for an inappropriate kind of reason, but some do, 
and in these cases it is wrong to choose (i). 
Alternatively, one can offer a more nuanced version of the “resist” response, 
distinguishing between act assessments and agent assessments.  For instance, one might argue 
that, while switching from (ii) to (i) for an inappropriate reason is permissible, the person who 
acts this way is to some extent morally deficient for having done so for an inappropriate reason.
25
  
Again, I need not here settle on whether to resist or revise in response to the above 
objection.  The availability of one response if not the other is good enough for now; future work 
might take this further, determining which response is most plausible, and more broadly working 
out what exactly to say about switching from less helpful helping to not helping at all. 
 
 
7.  Incurring Costs by Giving to Some Charities over Others   
 
Against the Common Assumption, I’ve argued that there are at least some cases in which there is 
optionality about whether to give (help) without optionality about where to give (help).  But 
recall that my main claim is stronger than this, i.e., that there are many cases in which there is 
optionality about whether to give without optionality about where to give. 
 Nonetheless, once we have the weaker claim, it seems a relatively easy task, 
philosophically speaking, to defend the stronger claim.  The task now consists in determining the 
prevalence of cases in which the various conditions present allow for optionality about whether 
to give without optionality about where to give.  This is of course largely an empirical matter, 
but there remain a few philosophically interesting issues about strengthening Avoid Gratuitous 
Worseness (weak). 
First, given the existence of significant moral options, there are many realistic scenarios 
in which it’s plausible that it is permissible not to give a sum of money to charity, even if giving 
would be much better than not giving.  It’s easy to imagine such scenarios by simply imagining 
that the sum of money in question is large, or that the potential donor is not well off financially. 
Next, it is likely that there are subsets of charities within the full set of charities you could 
give to, such that for each subset (a) it would be equally costly for you to give to each of the 
charities in the subset (again, working with my broad sense of “cost”), e.g., because all these 
                                                          
24
 Rulli (unpublished) has independently developed a similar move in response to what she calls the “easy 
exemption objection” in her work on conditional obligations. 
25 Somewhat similarly, if a runaway train is headed for five people and the only way to stop it from killing them is 
by diverting it onto a sidetrack on which someone you dislike is trapped, it may remain permissible to divert the 
train even if you do so merely in order to kill this person.  See Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.132 and for a reply see S. 
Matthew Liao, “Intentions and Moral Permissibility: The Case of Acting Permissibly with Bad Intentions,” Law and 
Philosophy 31 (2012): 703-724. 
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charities are equally near to your heart, because they’re all for the same cause (e.g., fighting 
blindness), and (b) the charities in the subset vary substantially in the amount of good per dollar 
you would do by giving to them.  The fact that very many charities within and across charitable 
cause types differ dramatically in the amount of good they do per dollar donated is well-
documented, especially in the context of priority-setting in global health.
26
  Though debatable, I 
here assume that these dramatic differences in the amount of good done per dollar between 
charities generally translate into dramatic differences in the amount of good per dollar you would 
do by giving to the most cost-effective charities over others.
27
                                                                                                                                                                
Within the subset of charities of which (a) holds (e.g., charities fighting blindness), it is 
wrong to give to those that do much less good per dollar, even when it’s not wrong not to give to 
any charity at all.  It seems to me this is already enough to conclude that there are many cases in 
which there’s optionality about whether to give without optionality about where to give.   
 But for all I’ve said so far, as long as you care a little bit more about giving to a 
blindness-fighting charity than a cancer-fighting charity, it would not be wrong to do the former, 
even if the cancer-fighting charity did much more good per dollar.  This is because Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness (weak) is so weak; it very meekly says it’s wrong to perform a much 
worse act when the better act would be no costlier to you to perform.  But if you cared just a little 
bit more about one charity than another, that’d constitute some cost, and so Avoid Gratuitous 
Worseness (weak) would fail to apply.  Discussing a philanthropist who was fonder of dogs than 
people, McMahan writes, “If the cost to her of giving her wealth away made it supererogatory to 
give it to any charity, the additional cost to her of giving it to charities that would help people 
rather than ones that would help dogs seems to exempt her from any duty to give it to the 
former.”28 
 This argument would fail to support the view that, in Arm Donor, it is permissible to save 
the one over the one hundred.  This is because in Arm Donor there is no additional cost to you to 
saving the one hundred rather than the one.  But we are now considering cases in which there is 
some additional cost to you in giving to some charities over others.  It is in these cases that 
McMahan’s argument applies.   
 In response, we could imagine a variant of Arm Donor in which, to save the one you 
would have to sacrifice your arm, while to save the one hundred you would have to sacrifice 
your arm and suffer a mild sore throat.  It still seems wrong to save the one.  While you would 
not be deliberately refusing to do something much better at no extra cost, you would be 
deliberately refusing to do something much better at only slightly extra cost.  That seems nearly 
as objectionable, and still wrong.  We might make an exception for those who are very badly off, 
                                                          
26
 For some relevant facts, see the World Health Organization’s Disease Control Priority Project report:  http://dcp-
3.org/dcp2.  As I noted, the effective altruism movement (see earlier citations) is largely driven by such facts about 
dramatic differences in cost-effectiveness. 
27
 Strictly speaking, the assumed link here is between the average amount of good done by charities per dollar 
donated to them and the expected amount of good per dollar your donations would do.  For some work that bears on 
the plausibility of this link, see Garrett Cullity, “Pooled Beneficence,” in Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, ed. 
Michael Almeida (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp.1-23; Shelly Kagan, “Do I Make a 
Difference?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011): 105-141; Julia Nefsky, “Consequentialism and the Problem 
of Collective Harm: A Reply to Kagan,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011): 364-395; and Mark Budolfson 
and Dean Spears, “Effective Altruism, Marginal Impact, and Fundraising: Weak Links in Effective Altruism’s 
Chain” (unpublished).   
28
 “Doing Good and Doing the Best,” manuscript p.6. 
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or who have in aggregate incurred very large costs for the sake of promoting the good.  Perhaps 
such people are not required to incur any further costs for the sake of promoting the good, no 
matter how small the costs and no matter much good they would promote if they did incur them.  
The vast majority of affluent people are not in this exceptional category.  Thus, if the dog-
enthusiast were not in this category, and if it were only slightly costlier to her to give her large 
sum of money to a much better charity than to give it to the charity for dogs (that does very little 
good), it would be wrong of her to give in this less good way even though not wrong of her not 
to give the sum to charity at all. 
As I have noted, Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (weak) fails to apply to cases in which 
there is some extra cost to you in giving to some charities over others.  We can thus consider 
strengthening the principle to various degrees: 
 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (still pretty weak):  It is wrong to perform an act that is  
much worse than another, if it is slightly costlier to you to perform the better act, 
and if all other things are equal.  
 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (moderate):  It is wrong to perform an act that is  
much worse than another, if it is moderately costlier to you to perform the better 
act, and if all other things are equal.  
 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (strong):  It is wrong to perform an act that is much worse  
than another, even if it is much costlier to you to perform the better act, and if all 
other things are equal.  
 
 As the Avoid Gratuitous Worseness principle grows in strength, it becomes progressively 
less intuitively plausible (though like the “weak” variant, the “still pretty weak” variant is still 
intuitively plausible, full stop).  Stronger and stronger variants of the principle will imply there 
are more and more cases in which it’s wrong to give some sum of money to some charities over 
others, even though not wrong not to donate this sum of money at all.   
Moreover, we might distinguish between variants of the principle on the basis of the 
particular type of cost in question, for example: 
 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (moderate / well-being cost):  It is wrong to perform an  
act that is much worse than another, if it is no more than moderately costlier to 
you in terms of your well-being to perform the better act, and if all other things 
are equal.  
 
Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (moderate / projects cost):  It is wrong to perform  
an act that is much worse than another, if it is no more than moderately costlier to 
you in terms of your projects to perform the better act, and if all other things are 
equal.  
 
 The Avoid Gratuitous Worseness principle will likely vary in plausibility depending on 
the kind of cost in question, e.g., I suspect that Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (moderate / projects 
cost) is plausible, if the cost is in terms of one’s projects only rather than one’s well-being, 
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whereas as I suspect Avoid Gratuitous Worseness (moderate / well-being cost) is a bit more 
controversial.  One might object that one cannot suffer a loss in terms of one’s projects without 
thereby suffering a loss in terms of one’s well-being; the two sorts of loss are inextricably linked.  
Even if that is correct, we can distinguish between losses to one’s well-being that strictly involve 
losses in terms of one’s projects, and losses to one’s well-being due to other factors (e.g., 
incurring pain or losing a limb).  And we can accordingly distinguish between different variants 
of Avoid Gratuitous Worseness.  Again, which of these variants of the principle is true will affect 
the number of cases in which there’s optionality about whether to give without optionality about 
where to give.    
We can further alter the strength and applicability of Avoid Gratuitous Worseness by 
tinkering with its “much worse” variable.  For instance, it may still seem wrong to perform an act 
that is only somewhat worse than another, if it is no costlier to you to perform the better act, and 
if all other things are equal.   
Finally, it is worth noting that in the case of charitable giving (unlike Arm Donor) you 
are usually able to split your donations among different charities.  You’re not forced to give all 
your money to one charity or the other, and considerations of cost to you may permit you to give 
some portion but not all of your “donation money” to charities closer to your heart over those 
that do much more good per dollar donated.  The remaining portion cannot permissibly be spent 
on these less good charities. 
Assuming there are moral options, it seems a pretty common occurrence for a potential 
donor to lack optionality with respect to where to give while nonetheless possessing optionality 
about whether to give.   
 
 
8.  Summing Up 
 
It is an interesting and important question what those attracted to moral options, and to non-
consequentialist thinking more broadly, should say about which charities to give to.  I’ve argued 
that one thing they should say is that there are many cases in which it would be wrong of you to 
give a sum of money to charities that do less good than other charities you could give to instead, 
even when it would not be wrong of you not to give the money to charity at all.  This claim is 
consistent with the effective altruist philosophy noted at the outset, and I believe it’s a claim non-
consequentialist effective altruists should accept. 
Working out with greater precision when one lacks optionality about whether and where 
to give will require careful assessment of the plausibility of different variants of Avoid 
Gratuitous Worseness, alongside sober sensitivity to the various morally relevant empirical 
considerations.  I hope such philosophical and empirical investigations will be taken further, to 
improve the ethics of giving both in theory and in practice.  
 
